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Richard Murray 
This paper relates the large scale effort to measure productivity in the produc- 
tion of public-sector goods and services in Sweden. It is organized as follows: 
First, there is a methodological part dealing with problems of measuring out- 
put in the public sector and how they are addressed in this study. This is under- 
taken in the context of  national accounting and deals with the problems of 
aggregation in choosing final output, of  weighting outputs and of  the treat- 
ment of  quality. Next,  results of  the study are presented. The huge drop in 
productivity is analyzed, and some main conclusions as to its causes are sug- 
gested. Finally, macroeconomic implications are briefly discussed. 
The Swedish study was organized by  a subgroup to the Expert Group on 
Public Finance (ESO) under the Ministry of  Finance. Several of  the studies 
were contracted out to independent researchers, agencies, and public organi- 
zations. But the conceptual framework of the study was closely controlled by 
the subgroup. Dr.  Ingvar Ohlsson headed this group, which was  set up in 
1982. A summary in English was published in 1987 (Ohlsson 1987). 
All segments of  the public sector were to be covered. Comprehensive or 
sample measurements were taken for roughly 70 percent of the sector, incor- 
porating the municipal, county, and national levels (including the national so- 
cial security administration). However, only the nonprofit activities were in- 
cluded. Public utilities like railroads, telecommunications, power and  heat, 
and housing were omitted for they are reasonably well covered by the national 
accounts as of today. An effort was made to extend the measurements as far 
back as 1960 and to make them cover the period up to 1980. In the vein of the 
national  accounts,  measurements  were  undertaken  with  a  base  year  for 
weights and price indexes. That base year was set to  1980, the end of  the 
Richard Murray has a Ph.D. in economics and is senior economist at the Swedish Agency for 
Administrative Development. 
517 518  Richard Murray 
period. Since the first report appeared, a series of productivity measurements 
extending the period up to 1985 were undertaken (see Murray 1987). 
The framework of the study is the national accounts scheme. Its concepts, 
theory, principles, and practices were consequently adopted as guidelines for 
the  study.  As  anyone  familiar  with  compiling  national  accounts  statistics 
knows,  this  includes  many  approximations  and  deviations  from  strict prin- 
ciples. 
Even though the United Nations has set standards for accounting, there are 
ambiguities stemming from a compromise of purposes for these accounts. The 
basic purpose has been to measure economic activity for business cycle anal- 
yses. This purpose comes very close to analyzing the laws of production and 
the measurement of productivity.  A different purpose is to measure income, 
welfare,  or even the quality of  life.  It is important to recognize that the na- 
tional  accounts,  according to the U.N. definitions, strike a compromise be- 
tween these two extremes. The stress is on production, but production should 
be measured in a way that is relevant to welfare. 
Therefore,  it is output-not  outcome, nor throughput-that  is to be mea- 
sured and with consumer evaluation as the measuring rod-even  for the pub- 
lic nonprofit, nonmarketable goods and services. 
14.1  Including the Public Sector in GNP 
When calculating GNP we add up value added in all sectors of the economy. 
The government nonprofit  sector is included with the sum of its wage bill. 
There are two corrections we want to make to this calculation: (1) the capital 
stock of the government ought to have a rental value that should be added to 
value added from the public sector; and (2) the change in productivity-value 
added in relation to labor input-should  be reflected in the value added by the 
public sector. 
As seen in table 14.1, GNP rose according to official estimates by 2.0 per- 
cent per year  1970-80.  Adding the rental value of capital in the government 
sector makes the growth increase to 2.1 percent. Assuming hypothetically that 
the government sector had a 2 percent growth of value added per year in rela- 
tion to the input of labor and capital reduces value added in 1970 by 17.071 
billion Swedish kronor (SEK) in  1980 prices. Growth goes up to 2.5 percent 
per year. It is clear that productivity in the government sector matters. 
In order to include the government  sector in a full account  of  GNP, one 
needs figures on value added for the government sector. Lacking this infor- 
mation, we may instead try to measure aggregate final output of government, 
calculate the rate of total factor productivity change for the sector as a whole, 
and from this infer the rate of change of value-added productivity. 
14.2  Aggregation Poses Problems 
Aggregation poses several problems of measurement: (1) What outputs are 
to be measured and included? When aggregating one runs the risk of double 519  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
Table 14.1  Correcting GNP  for the Rental Value of Capital and the Change in 
Productivity (billions of SEK, 1980 prices) 
1970 
1. GNP at market prices, official figures 
2. Of which: Government nonprofit 
3. Capital stock of government organizations 
4. 6% interest on capital stock 
5. GNP adjusted for interest on capital stock of gov- 
6. Of which: government nonprofit organizations 
7. 2% productivity growth per year of government 
organizations 
















crease (rows 1 + 4  + 7) 
8. GNP adjusted for capital stock and productivity in-  429.066  546.960 
counting. Which outputs are intermediate and which are final? (2) How does 
one sum pears and apples? By  kilos or by kronor? What weights should be 
used in adding outputs of different kinds? (3) How should quality be incorpo- 
rated in the output measurement? These questions become especially tricky 
where public-sector output is concerned, but they are also relevant to other 
sectors of the economy. 
The first question is, What is to be counted as output? Outputs that directly 
benefit consumers and producers outside the government sector should be in- 
cluded. They are final in relation to the government sector. Intermediate out- 
puts within the government sector should be excluded. There is, however, a 
problem of  aggregating the government and private sectors. Those outputs 
from the government sector that we consider here are typically free of charge. 
Still they may benefit private producers. That means that value added in the 
private sector is overstated and that we  would be counting this production 
twice if  we were to include this output in the government aggregate. Some 
other government outputs-like  environmental regulation-might  not show 
up  in the value of  production in the private sector or might even reduce its 
reported value while benefiting citizens and consumers. 
A very preliminary investigation on who are the beneficiaries of the govern- 
ment subsidized output sheds some light on how large this problem might be. 
In table 14.2 government output is measured in input terms, equivalent to 
what is called public consumption. That part of government output that di- 
rectly benefits the private sector-part  of the consumption of roads, harbors, 
employment agencies, and so on-has  diminished in  share although it has 
grown in volume. Recalculating the growth of GNP by subtracting this part of 
the contribution of  the public sector to GNP from that of  the private sector 
increases the growth of GNP by 0.14 percent over the ten years. 
A similar calculation was undertaken by  Kuznets (1971). He included a 
much larger part of the government output in what was to be subtracted from 520  Richard Murray 
Table 14.2  The Destination of Government Output, Percentage of Public 
Consumption (nominal prices) 
1970  1975  1980 
Input into production: 
Private industry  8.5  8.0  7.6 
Government  3.0  2.5  2.2 
Individual goods  61.6  63.7  68.0 
Consumption: 
Collective goods  26.9  25.8  22.2 
GNP as sheer costs to keep society functioning. General administration,  po- 
lice, military  defense, and so on were looked on as a prerequisite for other 
kinds of economic activities. Kuznets found that over 100 years the growth of 
the U.S. economy was lowered by 7 percent. 
How does one add the output from different government branches or differ- 
ent  outputs  within  the  same agency? Consumer evaluation  should  be  the 
guidepost, but this creates new problems because there are no market prices 
for these outputs. 
It has been suggested  (Ohlsson  1987, 38) that nominal user fees could be 
used as weights in case “the market” is in equilibrium, that is, that there are 
no unsatisfied wants manifesting themselves in queues. Because over 60 per- 
cent of  public consumption is individualistic in nature (see table 14.2, above), 
this argument carries a substantial weight. 
Consider the case of  health care in Sweden, which is to a very small extent 
financed by a user fee of about 60 SEK per visit. There are queues in some 
areas of health care, but on the whole the demand is met by an ample supply. 
The logic of such weights would be a drastically reduced health care. At the 
price of  60 SEK per visit,  Swedish hospitals  cannot carry their costs. The 
prices would seem to indicate that health care is supplied far beyond what is 
optimal. Libraries, museums, schools, and  such would  be valued  nil,  also 
implying that a sharply reduced  level of spending would come closer to the 
optimum. 
Because there is very little political and public support for cutbacks on gov- 
ernment output, these services must be more highly valued than is reflected in 
the user fees. Evidently there are collective evaluations even concerning indi- 
vidual public goods. 
How to incorporate changes in quality is a well-known problem in the con- 
struction  of  price  indexes. This becomes  more  problematic  if  there are no 
prices from which to infer the characteristics that command the willingness of 
the consumers to pay. However, techniques like conjoint analysis (Cattin and 
Wittink  1982; McFadden  1976) could  be applied to public-sector  output to 
reveal consumer evaluations. 
What counts as quality are only those characteristics of a good that appeal 521  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
to the consumer. But who is the consumer? There might be a genuine conflict 
of interests between citizens/consumers and politicians/principals. (This con- 
flict is also relevant  in  the identification  of  outputs and  in the  choosing of 
weights  but  is best treated in connection with quality.) Although  politicians 
may rate the accuracy of the Swedish internal revenue service highly, citizens 
might have an opposite view. There are merit want goods that would not even 
qualify as outputs in the eyes of all citizens, like advertisements on the dan- 
gers of smoking. In these cases we are apt to take the view of the politicians 
and regard them as the final consumers. 
14.3  Practical Solutions 
14.3.1  Final Output 
It is easier to conceptualize final output than to measure it. The goods we 
are envisaging might well be consumed by specific individuals or organiza- 
tions outside the government sector, but they are ordered and paid for by quite 
different bodies. There is no connection between payment and consumption, 
which makes identification of outputs much more complicated than of goods 
on a market. Payment to government organizations is for resources and activ- 
ities and not for outputs. Because the financing bodies pay for office spaces, 
traveling, coffee breaks, staff meetings, and data machines as well as for op- 
erations, teaching, land surveys, and court proceedings, asking what the prin- 
cipal is paying for in order to determine what are the final outputs is not at all 
helpful. From that point of view it is not apparent why the latter should qualify 
as outputs and why the former would not. This causes a well-known lack of 
goal consciousness on behalf of government organizations and their staff and 
also makes it a cumbersome, sometimes delicate and questionable,  exercise 
to choose the final outputs. 
Despite the funny way government production is financed, it was of consid- 
erable help to think about what the principal was purchasing.  Would he be 
purchasing coffee breaks? Would he be purchasing capacity without produc- 
tion? Other questions that were asked: What are the ends that the services to 
identify should serve? What outputs serve the outside world? These questions 
guided the choice of output indicators in the Swedish report. 
Applying, for example, the question of  what the principal is purchasing 
clarifies what are the outputs in the following instances: Is the end product of 
the internal revenue service the tax receipts it collects? Is the output of the 
social security service the benefits that are paid out? Of course not. Output is 
instead the handling of these payments. Agencies are doing a good job when 
they collect or pay the correct amount, without delay and at low administra- 
tive costs. 
But there are instances that are more ambiguous. From the point of view of 
the agency, informing citizens on their rights might look very much as an end 522  Richard Murray 
product, especially because the agency is instructed to carry out this activity. 
However, from the point of view of the citizens, information is a prerequisite 
for the exercising of rights, just like information on prices and qualities in a 
market. So we chose not to include information in the output when seen as a 
supporting service. 
On occasion, we were forced to measure a host of  outputs from one agency 
in order to capture it fully. However, this ran the risk of including intermediate 
products. Again, what are the outputs of the internal revenue service? Is it the 
handing out of forms to citizens, the information on how to fill in these forms 
correctly, the collection and the scrutinizing of the forms, and investigations 
into  the  accounting  books  of  the  firms,  the  processing  of  bank  accounts, 
checks on employers payments of  benefits to employees,  and so on? In this 
case all these  activities add up to one final product:  the completion of  the 
informational  basis  necessary  for  taxing  and  billing  the citizens.  The end 
product then is the complete processing of the tax form of  a citizen or a com- 
pany. All activities within the internal revenue service contribute to this end. 
But instead of measuring them all and then aggregating them in relation  to 
their contribution, it is preferable to measure the final output directly. This is 
what  has  been  done wherever  possible.  In the case of  the internal  revenue 
service tax forms processed are counted as final output. 
Agency representatives,  personnel,  ministerial supervisors, and politicians 
often see the identification  of an agency’s final output as an oversimplifica- 
tion. It is much easier to gain the acceptance from the man in the street, who 
has an exceptional and under-utilized talent for disentangling the relevance. If 
it is possible to find a measure for the aggregate output, it simplifies matters a 
great deal.  Government production  is often hierarchical:  parliament  formu- 
lates the policies; ministries issue goals for production; national government 
agencies survey county or municipal government organizations doing the ac- 
tual production-teaching,  day nursing, medical care, and so on. Wherever it 
has been  possible to identify and measure final output (like the  number of 
children trained at school) for the whole chain of producers, that is what was 
done. Of course, in that way it is not possible to distinguish the contribution 
to the final output at each level. And the efforts of parliament, ministries, and 
supervising bodies are all reduced to input and resource consumption (which 
may not appeal to their idea of their own importance).  In this way the mea- 
surement of the national government was reduced to one third of total employ- 
ment. Two thirds were allocated as inputs to final outputs from the local gov- 
ernments. To take the most brutal example: all the administration of building 
control and financing and community planning  was seen as input to a very 
crude indicator of the governmental output “physical planning”: the total vol- 
ume of construction. 
On occasion it was not possible to find an acceptable measure of final out- 
put. For example, what is the final output of the military? There are a multi- 
tude of activities that add  up to the capacity to defend the country against 523  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
military intrusion. One such activity is the training of  military personnel. That 
output may be measured. But there are also other activities, like additions to 
the stock of  weapons and systems, maintenance and the repair thereof, plan- 
ning, surveillance, and spying. In  these cases there is no other way  but to 
measure these intermediate outputs and add them up. In the case of defense, 
the productivity in training of recruits and pilots served as representative in- 
dicators for the whole sector. 
Representative parts  of  sector production  were  used  in  some  other  in- 
stances: productivity change for Statistics Sweden was calculated on a sample 
of 20 percent of its products, for hospitals on 30 percent of the clinics, and for 
libraries on public libraries of  local communities only. But, aside from these 
examples, most of the calculations were based on aggregate output statistics 
and aggregate resource consumption. 
Of course, there is a risk of double counting when calculations are based on 
intermediate outputs.  Adding intermediate outputs instead of  adding value 
added or estimating overall productivity change from a partial productivity 
measure is quite tricky. There are instances when the change of productivity 
of an internal process is a good approximation to the change of productivity 
in  the overall operation. And  there are instances when this is not so. As an 
example one might think  of  a partial productivity measure like number of 
pupils trained per teacher. If  the number of teachers and other resources re- 
mained the same and teacher productivity increased by  4 percent, it  is very 
likely that overall productivity would also increase by 4 percent. However, if 
the number of pupils remained the same and the number of teachers decreased 
by 4 percent, while other resources remained the same, the teacher productiv- 
ity increase would overstate the overall productivity increase. 
From the point of view of  the agency, it might be very relevant indeed to 
include every activity that adds to the workload. However, that may end up 
relating input to input. 
The dangers in adding intermediate outputs or in inferring from productiv- 
ity change in intermediate production to overall productivity change call for a 
quest for final outputs as far as possible. Among the 14 national government 
agencies in the Swedish study, the number of output indicators varied from 2 
to 3 to 40. In other sectors the variation is even greater. Community planning 
rested on only one crude measure, as previously mentioned; the health sector 
built on over 300 measures: the output of the sample of clinics was treated as 
unique to each clinic and given a separate weight. In appendix A, I provide a 
sample of output indicators. 
14.3.2  Weights 
Determining weights for the nonmarketed services of the public sector is in 
principle a matter of social benefit analyses. Such analyses provide values that 
could serve as weights in a measurement of  government output that is truly 
welfare oriented. However, except for cases such as labor market policies, 524  Richard Murray 
roads, education, and some others, estimates of  social benefits have not been 
performed successfully. Therefore vast areas are left without weights. 
Discarding the need to aggregate dissimilar services and concentrating on 
services with similar aims, it would be quite satisfactory to have estimates of 
service effectiveness.  All  government  goods and  services that  aim, for ex- 
ample, primarily  at saving lives could  be given  weights  according  to  their 
effectiveness in this respect. Such weights would indicate the relative contri- 
bution to the common aim. 
This works in only a few instances and on an almost microlevel, because 
the intended effects  are so specific to the services produced. Within the health- 
care  sector  many other goals are pursued  beside  saving lives,  like  getting 
people back to work, or curing for a better life or preventing possible ills. If 
several goals are to be included, we are back to weighing social benefits. 
In  some instances  weights  were judged by  service effectiveness. An  ex- 
ample is the use of flight simulators in the training of air force pilots. For those 
parts of the training where simulators were used, they were deemed by profes- 
sional teachers to teach the same things that would otherwise be trained in the 
air at a much higher cost. Those hours were added with the same weights, 
which contributed substantially to a productivity increase in the training of air 
force  pilots.  A  second  example  is  the  customs  authority  that  completely 
changed its style of work from storing and inspecting goods themselves to a 
system of self-declarations  by importers. Output in terms of possibilities to 
levy taxes and duties remained  the same. Regarding these different forms of 
outputs  as equivalent makes the customs authority register a substantial in- 
crease in  productivity.  In  addition, importers  benefited  from speedier deli- 
veries. 
Also, in cases where we use highly aggregated measures of output there is 
an implied cost-effectiveness weighting: tax forms are divided up in only two 
types, each with  a separate weight, but  within  each type all tax  forms are 
treated as equal. 
In the public sector we have substituted politicians for the market. An inter- 
esting approach is to regard politicians’ decisions as the revealed preferences 
of the electorate. Marginal costs of production are then the prices at which the 
substitute (representative?) consumers (politicians!) would go shopping. They 
would  buy  health care up to the point  where its additional  value equals its 
marginal cost. Values would thus be reflected in marginal costs. 
Of course, this is based on a very optimistic view of the rationality of the 
political and administrative  process  governing the production process in the 
public sector. But there  seems to be no other comprehensive approach that 
could compete with it. 
However, it has one severe drawback, for it leaves no room for productivity 
increases  via a more  efficient  output  mix.  Suppose that  very  many  elderly 
people are taken care of at regular hospitals at a very high cost and that one 
finds out that many of them might be better taken care of at retirement homes 525  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
at a lower cost. Moving some of the elderly patients out of the hospitals and 
into retirement homes increases unit costs both at the hospitals and at the 
retirement homes because those patients that are transferred cost more than 
the average at the retirement homes and less than the average at the hospitals. 
Productivity decreases in both places. However, realizing that the value of a 
place in a retirement home is just as high or even higher than the value of a 
place in a hospital would cause productivity to go up in both places. 
The revealed preference approach has still another major drawback. It is 
that government policies cannot be evaluated from the outside. What politi- 
cians do is the best that can be done-as  Dr. Pangloss might have said. Con- 
sequently, wherever possible we tried to insert weights that reflected the social 
benefit or the service effectiveness. For the remainder, that is, the main body 
of weights, we made do with marginal costs as weights. 
Using unit costs from a specific base year as weights implies another inter- 
pretation of the change in productivity aside from the change in welfare. The 
aggregate government output equals the change in costs assuming constant 
unit costs. Productivity then reflects the change in productive capacity. 
14.3.3  Quality 
Realizing that quality lies at the heart of the service makes it easier to spot 
the important variables. The main qualitative aspect of  weather forecasts is 
that they are correct: the percentage of correct prognosis in terms of tempera- 
ture, wind, and rain can be measured. Social security checks should be correct 
in relation to legislation: random samples can be evaluated. Roads should be 
safe: the rate of accidents is recorded. We  have recorded such quality indica- 
tors, which is half the problem. The other half  is how  to adjust output for 
quality. 
Dealing with quality includes the choice of output measures. One may dis- 
tinguish between three kinds of output variables: throughput, output, and out- 
come. Throughput measures work loads and may even come close to input, 
like the number of cases in the in file. Output is the goods or services deliv- 
ered, like the number of cases handled. Outcome is the result from the point 
of view of the principal or the customer, for example, the reception of valuable 
advice. 
National accounts have no standard in this respect, for they measure what- 
ever has a price tag. Therefore, for government output one has to think about 
and try to find out what would have a price tag if  these goods and services 
were sold on a market. 
Let us take the example of  crime investigation: A crime is reported to the 
police, it is registered, and there is a good chance that it will be investigated 
by  the police, and a lesser chance that  it might be  solved. Output could be 
measured by  the number of reports. This is throughput. Or it could be mea- 
sured by the number of cases investigated-this  is output. Or it could be mea- 
sured as the number of cases solved-this  is output with an eye to outcome. 526  Richard Murray 
The man in the street is interested in nailing the criminal-solving  the crime. 
So are the principals,  although they realize that it will not be possible ever to 
solve each and every crime. 
Suppose we were to measure the number of  investigations  as output and 
then would like to adjust that measure with a measure of  the quality of that 
output. Various candidates could be the number of hours spent on a case, the 
qualification of the personnel, the number of pages of written report on a case, 
and the percentage of cases solved. The percentage of cases solved no doubt 
comes closest to the result of fulfilling the objective of the principal. So  why 
not include the quality aspect of output in the measure,  that is, counting as 
output the number of cases solved! That is exactly what we did. 
Market prices reflect the value of the output to the consumer, if markets are 
in equilibrium.  Using  prices  as weights  incorporates quality  in  the  output 
measure.  This is however, an individual evaluation, which does not encom- 
pass distributional aspects and externalities.  To parallel the measurement of 
marketed outputs, such considerations should not enter into the measurement 
of government output, either. We  may stop investigating whether in the long 
run the outputs of the police in terms of solved crimes actually produce fewer 
crimes, as long as there is a demand for solving crimes by both principals and 
citizens. This is analogous to not investigating whether cars make people hap- 
pier: people buy them; that is enough for national accounts’ purposes. 
Far from being neglected,  quality has in many ways been included in the 
measurements  of public-sector output in the Swedish study. Here are some 
examples: 
Measurements  have  favored  outcome  indicators  that  have  a  reasonably 
close connection  to the output.  For example, number  of  treated  patients is 
preferred in relation to hospital days. This statistic has its drawbacks but it 
captures the shortening of hospital stays. The output of highway authorities is 
measured by the number of miles traveled by various vehicles on those high- 
ways  rather  than  by  the  number  of  miles  of  roads  maintained  and  built. 
Whether highway authorities build roads for which there is demand or roads 
that are wasted is included in the measure in this way. 
Another way to treat quality change is to separate services of different qual- 
ities,  assign different weights and then  aggregate.  For example, treated pa- 
tients are divided into 312 different outputs according to the type of clinic, 
each  with  a different  weight.  Changes  in the composition  of  treatments- 
more or less qualified-are  thereby  captured.  Quality adjustment is a very 
similar exercise. The social insurance office increased the quality of their ben- 
efit payment by acquiring more accurate and up-to-date  information on the 
incomes of the insured. Before this was done, output was regarded as one type 
of  output,  afterward  as  another  kind;  they  were  also  assigned  different 
weights. Moreover,  added features may be included as new outputs, for ex- 
ample, separate rooms at hospitals and lunches at school. 
Sometimes quality may be transformed into quantity. The main output of 527  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
Statistics  Sweden consists  of  several statistical  products  that  remain  fairly 
constant.  However,  their  precision  changes  according  to  enlargement  of 
samples or new sampling techniques.  Most qualitative changes may be recal- 
culated in terms of the size of the sample and measured as such. 
Closely related to these ways of dealing with  quality is the technique  to 
discard all those costs associated with quality increase. The costs of  health 
care, education, leisure activities,  and some other qualitative  improvements 
of prisons were excluded from total costs. These were considered as important 
improvements in prisons both from a humane perspective  and from a thera- 
peutic point of view.  However, the effect on the tremendous productivity  de- 
cline was negligible, and criminal recidivism remained unaltered. 
All these methods produce output measures either that incorporate quality 
or that deduct the costs associated with quality. Of crucial importance when 
adjusting for quality, however, is what weights are used. More often than not 
the weights  are unit  costs or marginal  costs associated with  the  change  in 
quality. This practice rests on the assumption that those costs would not have 
been incurred had the qualitative increase not been valued at least as high as 
that cost. The measure of output in that case is biased downward. On the other 
hand, the rationality assumption might be totally false and the output measure 
could be biased upward. 
Quality poses a measurement problem only insofar as it changes. One way 
of  controlling  for  quality  is  merely  to  look  for indicators  that  might  tell 
whether quality has been changing. One may look at the effects of government 
programs,  like health  indicators,  recidivism of  criminals,  scores in student 
achievement tests, and road traffic accidents. Of course, these indicators may 
be  influenced  by  other factors than the  quality of  government output. The 
evidence must therefore be interpreted with care. 
Throughout the study checks on quality were performed. Some indicated a 
definite quality increase, like road safety and precision  in weather forecasts, 
that could not be incorporated in any reasonable way in the output measure. 
Most of the checks indicated no change, which made it possible to leave out- 
put measures as they were. 
14.4  Other Methodological Problems and Their Solutions 
I will now briefly mention some other methodological problems and how 
they were addressed in order that the reader may correctly appraise the results 
of the study that are to be presented subsequently. 
Two aggregated measures for the government sector as a whole were pre- 
sented: One covered the measured parts of the government sector, where each 
measured entity was weighted by its cost share in 1980. Another was for the 
government sector as a whole, where measured entities were weighted accord- 
ing to the share of public consumption that the purposes they represent com- 
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only for the period 1970-80,  where the coverage was best. The two measures 
for the sector as a whole came out almost identical. This is in large part due 
to the 70 percent coverage of  the measurements. Therefore, only the latter, 
representative, productivity measure is presented in the following. 
The denominator in the productivity expression has been calculated along 
the lines of the national accounts. For some branches the cost is set equivalent 
to public consumption in fixed prices. It includes depreciation of capital but 
no interest charge. For others the cost in fixed prices is calculated from costs 
in nominal prices deflated by  implicit price indexes for various inputs in the 
national accounts. Deflating costs by  the consumer price index would have 
produced different results. 
Sensitivity tests have been performed in very many ways. Different ways of 
measuring output, different systems of weights, different deflators, and so on, 
have been tried. Of course, results are influenced, but on the whole the results 
are quite robust for variations that  are reasonable and compatible with the 
general approach. Needless to say, the quoted figures are not exact. An inter- 
val  of  t0.5  percentage points should be added to the stated figures on the 
average yearly growth rate of a sector. In the aggregate the confidence interval 
is likely to be smaller. 
14.5  Productivity in the Government Sector of Sweden 1960-1985 
This study is unique in that it covers a very long period of time, 25 years, 
and most of the government sector, whether national, county, or local.' The 
1960-85 time period includes those years in which the large public sector, the 
welfare state, was created in the industrialized countries. There are reasons to 
believe that the patterns that emerge in the Swedish Report are indicative of 
what has been going on in other countries as well.2  What we are witnessing is 
not some special political effect of a social democratic regime. 
1.  References, necessarily in Swedish, are given to all separate studies in the reference list. 
2.  For the Netherlands there is a study that resembles the Swedish (Goudriaan, de Groot, and 
van Tulder 1987). It covers the period 1975-83,  56 percent of the government output-32  large, 
publicly provided services within the six subsectors: ten health services, seven types of education, 
five social and cultural services, three modes of public transport, four services of the police and 
justice system, and three executive branches of the tax  and social security administration, and 
costs are deflated by consumer prices. In eight years costs per unit increased on the average by 4 
percent. 
In Denmark partial analyses of local public services point in the same direction (Mikkelsen 
1982). 
The conclusion from ad hoc studies for a few areas in the United States is that state and local 
government productivity has remained stagnant or decreased over the past several decades (Fisk 
1983). 
Crude labor-output relations over the years 1960-80  for a few public services in some indus- 
trialized countries indicate productivity decrease (Maddison 1984). 
The only puzzling exception is the U.S. federal government, which, since 1967 and up to 1986, 
has recorded a yearly productivity increase of  1.5 percent. Measurements cover two-thirds of the 
employment, are made to a large extent on an intermediate level, and outputs are related only to 
labor inputs (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1988). 529  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
Table 14.3  Productivity Growth in the Government Sector of Sweden 1960-1980 
(yearly change in percent) 
1960-65  1965-70  1970-75  1975-80  1970-80 
General administration 










...  -3.7 
...  -  2.7 
-3.2  -6.3 
-  3.6  -3.1 
-0.4  -  2.6 
...  ... 
-4.9  +3.0 
+ 1.5  +2.1 
















-  2.2 
-  0.2 
-  0.4 
-8.9 
-  1.8 
+  0.4 
-  1.6 
-0.6 
-  1.6 
-0.6 
-  1.5 
-  1.8 
-  2.5 




-  1.5 
Table 14.4  Productivity Growth for Selected Branches of the Government 1980- 
1985 (yearly change in percent) 
Branch  Growth 
National government administration (1980-83)  3.5 
Primary schools  -0.3 
Secondary schools 
Colleges 
Health care (1980-84) 
Social welfare (1980-84) 
Libraries 
-  1.8 
-  1.7 
-  2.2 
+  2.0 
-2.9 
I will now  discuss results from the Swedish study, as presented in tables 
14.3, 14.4, and 14.5. The general picture of Swedish public-sector productiv- 
ity  is  one  of  decline.  With  few  exceptions,  all  the  studied  government 
branches  and  individual agencies show a negative productivity change. In 
business it may happen that the productivity of a branch decreases, but only 
for a short period of time. After such a period, forces are set in motion-that 
is, competition-to  correct the course, and the branch gets back on the track 
of  productivity increase. In  government production the reverse seems to be 
true: productivity may increase, but only for short periods of time. Then it is 
typically followed by continual productivity decreases. 
There are exceptions, but they are few: the National Agency for Roads (the 
main part of economic services), the Board of Customs, the National Housing 
Board, the Meteorological Institute, Statistics Sweden, the Salaries and Pen- 
sions Board, and county-council-operated psychiatric care. These activities 
have experienced a positive productivity change on the average throughout the 
period. 
Over time there are some sparks of light. The productivity of  the national Table 14.5  Productivity Growth in the National Government Administration, 1960-85  (yearly change in percent) 
Agency  1960-65  1965-70  1970-75  1975-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
National Labor Market Board  -  1.9  -  7.4  -  3.5  1.9  22.8  13.1  2.4  -2.9 
National Housing Board  5.0  -  0.6  6.6  2.0  5.2  -  8.2  2.9  -  1.3 
courts  -5.4  -0.9  1.3  2.8  -  1.2  11.2  -0.9  -0.2  -  3.0 
Prisons  -5.6  -  6.0  -11.0  0.3  -0.2  3.2  -9.7  -  4.5 
Enforcement service  -4.1  -4.9  3.1  0.8  3.4  -5.8  -  3.0  1.3 
National Board of  Agriculture  -5.0  -1.6  0.6  1.1 
National Land Survey  -4.0  0.3  -2.9  2.5  -  2.3  5.8  -  1.3  4.0  7.3 
Police  -  1.8  -  6.2  3.6  -0.5  3.7  -  3.6  0.9  -5.5 
Social security  -  1.0  -  2.6  -4.8  -0.2  -0.7  0.2  3.5  3.8 
Tax administration  -  2.9  -7.1  -  6.4  5.1  10.9  2.9  -1.3  -  12.0  -6.7 
Board of Customs  5.0  5.2  -4.3  4.1  -  0.5  4.3  8.9  2.0  -4.4 
Patent & Registration Office  -4.3  -3.2 
Statistics Sweden  2.4  1  .o 
Salaries & Pensions Board 
Meteorological Institute  -3.1  4.2  -3.7  4.7 
(not included in the aggre- 
gate)  1.2  3.6  2.4  8.3  -0.5  -0.5 
Total  -  2.0  -3.3  -5.2  2.5 531  Measuring Public-Sector Output 
government administration plunges very deep in the years 1960-75,  but from 
1975 and on, there is a marked increase in productivity (tables 14.4 and 14.5). 
Social welfare turns from productivity decline in the early 1970s to productiv- 
ity increases in the early 1980s. 
Studying the trends more closely, one finds a very definite relationship be- 
tween the growth of output and the rate of productivity change. A faster in- 
crease in output is connected with a lesser decline of productivity or even with 
an  increase in  productivity. We  can also see that there  are instances when 
agencies have absorbed large increases in work loads despite an unchanged 
capacity, indicating that they have had an excess capacity. For example, the 
employment agency managed to handle a 23 percent increase in the number 
of job seekers in 1981 with constant resources. 
Decreases in output invariably lead to declining productivity. Resources are 
not cut back in proportion to diminishing work loads, if at all. In the  1980s 
there are some examples of national government agencies that manage to de- 
crease inputs in relation  to a decrease in outputs, for example, the housing 
board, the enforcement service, and the social insurance offices. 
The sluggish response of government production units has been observed 
by  many others.  It causes substantial cost increases because “demand” for, 
and output from, the public sector varies a great deal. This we now  know, 
thanks to the studies performed  on public-sector output. The pattern of de- 
mand is very clearly countercyclical. Increases in demand, for reasons to be 
investigated by future researchers, take place in periods of recession; demand 
stagnates in periods of boom. This increases the cost of sluggish response in 
adjusting the resource requirements. 
In addition to different conditions of survival, are there different demands 
on private and public organizations that explain the sluggish response? When 
facing a rising demand, a private firm may either raise the price or refuse to 
serve some customers if production capacity is not adequate. A public orga- 
nization cannot do that. It does not control price. It has an obligation to serve 
and treat  all alike.  There is a case for running the show permanently  with 
excess capacity, but not with a continuously growing excess capacity, which 
is what the productivity decline seems to indicate. 
What characterizes those activities that have had a long-run increase in pro- 
ductivity? Roads have had the most spectacular growth in demand. Output, 
measured by vehicle miles, has risen steadily with an average of 4.5 percent 
per year. This, plus the technical  advance in road construction and mainte- 
nance, should be enough to boost productivity to the highest levels. It is a real 
surprise that productivity under these circumstances increases by only 0.4 per- 
cent per year. It makes a great difference whether capital costs are included or 
not. If costs are calculated as the sum of consumption and investments, pro- 
ductivity increases at roughly 4 percent per year. But this is due to a sharp 
decline in road investments. If, instead, depreciation on the accumulated cap- 
ital stock is included (as it should be), the rise in productivity almost disap- 532  Richard Murray 
pears. An increase in quality in terms of safer roads and roads that save fuels, 
time, and wear and tear is not included in the measurement. 
The board of customs has also faced a steadily rising demand of 3-4  per- 
cent per year in the number of  shipments to be declared, and the number of 
vehicles and passengers crossing national borders. But there are also examples 
of  radical changes in  work  styles. In  addition to the previously mentioned 
introduction of a self-declaration system, Sweden and its neighbors share the 
responsibility for border control. These changes in work style show up in a 
productivity increase. 
Periodically there has been a large increase in the demand for meteorologi- 
cal forecasts. A large part of the production is sold on an almost commercial 
basis. Production has been heavily computerized. This shows up in a produc- 
tivity increase, but only of 0.5 percent per year. The importance of comput- 
erization lies in dramatically increased capacity to process large amounts of 
information, which has resulted in more correct prognoses. 
In conjunction with massive housing programs, the output of the housing 
board in terms of mortgages handled has increased steadily at a rate of more 
than 5 percent per year. For some reason this agency has not received much 
political attention and consequently not much resources. Very little technical 
change has taken place. The central part of the agency has diminished in re- 
lation to the local parts. Increased productivity of around 3 percent per year is 
best interpreted as the exploitation of economies of scale. 
Even in-patient psychiatric care at hospitals has expanded strongly in the 
period,  at roughly 5 percent per year, measured as the number of  patients 
admitted. The productivity increase of 2.2 percent per year originates out of a 
shortening of  the average length of  stay from 300 days to 100 days, mainly 
because of the use of psychiatric drugs, that is, an example of  technological 
advance. 
It is very difficult indeed to see in what way these areas differ fundamentally 
from  other  areas of  government production.  They have  all experienced a 
strong expansion of  demand,  but so have some other areas. It is evident, 
though, that a strong increase in output helps productivity growth. The ques- 
tion remains, What makes productivity decrease? From economic theory it is 
very difficult to deduce the causes of technological retrogression. 
Of  course, there is the possibility that there are diseconomies of scale and 
an increasing marginal cost of output. Because production in the government 
sector more often than not is organized by  a single producer, it might be es- 
pecially susceptible to diseconomies of scale. In addition to too-large produc- 
tion units there is the diseconomy of stretching government programs to cover 
ever-larger proportions  of  the  population.  Travel  assistance to  the  handi- 
capped and the elderly is less costly to organize in densely populated areas. 
The costs increase as this service is offered in more sparsely populated areas. 
The cost of secondary education increases more than in proportion to the num- 
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households  with  TV  programs  is very  costly  in  relation  to  average cost, 
clearly. This hypothesis needs to be tested empirically. 
Another hypothesis is that regulation has increased within government oP- 
erations and that this has caused a falling productivity. The productivity in- 
crease of the National Housing Board is evidence that this need not be so. Its 
operations have been bounded by an ever more complicated legislation. Gen- 
eral regulation in areas such as environment, employment, and taxes should 
have harmed the private sector as well, but we see no sign of that in terms of 
productivity decline. Shortened work hours do not in themselves cause pro- 
ductivity to decrease, because we have deflated costs with an index of  the 
effective wage  rate.  However, indirectly this might increase costs,  for ex- 
ample, by  raising the number of  square meters of  office space needed per 
employee. This should happen in private and government organizations alike. 
But we  know that government organizations utilize a lot more office space 
than private organizations, in for example, dentistry, schools, hospitals, and 
consultanc  y. 
An hypothesis connected with the former is that agencies do not adapt their 
input mix to changes in relative prices of  inputs. This is either because of 
general lack of cost consciousness or because of detailed regulation regarding 
what inputs to use. Such a hypothesis is not supported by evidence from the 
study of state agencies. In the aggregate of these agencies there is a substantial 
change in the input mix, and it is in  line with the changes in relative prices 
(see table 14.6). The labor share diminishes from 81.4 percent in 1960 to 73.7 
percent in 1980, while, for example, office space increases from 4.1 percent 
to 10.0 percent. At the same time, wages increased by  456 percent and rents 
by  300 percent. For  all but one agency the growth in labor productivity is 
larger than that in total factor productivity. This demonstrates, contrary to this 
hypothesis and some popular beliefs, that state agencies do plan their resource 
mix in accordance with the relative prices of inputs and that there are possibil- 
ities for input substitution. 
Most importantly, though, is that the measurements of output in the govern- 
ment sector might have missed an important qualitative improvement of the 
services. All the studies made serious efforts to detect qualitative change. But, 




1960  1980  1960-80 
Labor  81.4  13.1  +  456 
Intermediary inputs  14.3  15.0  +  400 
Office space  4.1  10.0  +  300 
Capital  0.2  1.4  -t  257 534  Richard Murray 
of course, they are hampered by a lack of data. As far as one may judge from 
the evidence at hand, though, the qualitative changes left out ought not affect 
the conclusions dramatically. 
The most difficult area to judge in this respect is health care. In order that 
the 3 percent decrease in productivity  be compensated by  a quality increase 
the value of the health-care  services must on the average be twice as high in 
1985 as they were in  1960. Although the measures employed capture some 
elements of quality like the shortening of  hospital stays and the shift of  work 
loads from more costly  clinics to less costly,  there are shortcomings in the 
measures of  output. We  know of  spectacular  advances in medicine  in very 
narrow disciplines that have not been accommodated. We know that the mea- 
surements of  output would be better if made in diagnostically related groups; 
then we would, for example, capture the productivity increase in the treatment 
of ulcer with drugs instead  of by surgery.  But over the period there are no 
clear signs of improved health, fewer sick days, or longer life expectancy, and 
so on. This is astounding, because  it is not only a matter of the quality of 
health care but should also be influenced by the massive quantitative increase 
in output-roughly  65 percent from 1960 to 1985. Have conditions that influ- 
ence health really undergone such a dramatic deterioration? 
In education one source of decreasing productivity is claimed to be the di- 
minishing  size of  classes.  Also,  it  is  claimed  that  decreasing  the  student- 
teacher ratio should be a qualitative  improvement  (although educational re- 
search does not support that contention). There are some studies of  student 
achievement that roughly cover the period of investigation, and they show no 
sign of improvement. 
Qualitative changes in social welfare services have been investigated thor- 
oughly in connection with the Swedish study particularly in two areas: child 
care and elderly care. A host of qualitative indicators has been analyzed, but 
with no definite answer. 
And so the story goes. In area on area, with few exceptions, there is no 
evidence of a qualitative change that would upset our measurements. Enforce- 
ment services collect slightly less SEK out of what they should collect; crim- 
inals go back into crimes to the same extent after treatment in prisons; crimes 
committed continue to increase despite an increased police output; and so on. 
Except for in the areas mentioned there is no evidence to support the belief 
that quality has increased. This is a bold  statement, and it needs reexamina- 
tion from another point of view.  Agencies often point to added features of the 
output. At the hospitals, patients are nowadays lodged in rooms of  their own 
or in smaller groups than before.  Citizens today receive advance notice that 
their passports expire. These are examples of  valuable improvements in out- 
put. There are many more. 
An hypothesis is that  the increase in costs and lowered productivity may 
have been caused by a proliferation of  added features of government output. 
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the taxes-in  which to test the value of the products, new features and new 
products may be launched even if their value is far below the added cost. 
Substantial effort has been put into investigating this issue. One case is that 
of  prisons. It has been said that costs have increased because of  a series of 
improvements, like the introduction of  vocational training, leisure activities, 
extra costs incurred with more lenient rules for prisoners to leave the prisons 
temporarily, and so forth. Interestingly enough, the costs that were identified 
by  the prison authorities were of  a rather smallish nature. Out of  a total in- 
crease of unit costs by  252 percent these costs were calculated to add 28 per- 
centage points. The investigators identified other sources of cost increase that 
were  much more important (see table  14.7). Fewer clients per supervisor 
added 38 percentage point and reduced crowdedness 35 percentage points. 
However, the main part of the cost increase remained unexplained. 
Libraries are another example. It has been contended that libraries nowa- 
days are much more than book-lending machines. They serve the general pub- 
lic with information, they arrange cultural events, they serve as public sitting 
rooms  where people go to read  newspapers. The extra cost for these by- 
products is, however, estimated at only 3 percent of  total operating costs of 
libraries. It is negligible in relation to the 25 percent decrease in productivity. 
If  classes in primary schools had not become smaller productivity would 
still have declined -  1.7 percent per year. Not  accounting for this “quality 
increase,” productivity  dropped -  2.8 percent.  Excluding the  cost  of  in- 
creased room  standard at hospitals reduces the productivity decline by  0.1 
percent per year. Hence, although the costs incurred from added features on 
occasion may be quite impressive, they are far from explaining the long-run 
productivity decline. 
What other causes of productivity decline are there? Excess capacity is one 
piece  of  evidence  that  slack  exists.  Another  is  the  productivity increase 
brought about by  less lenient budgetary appropriations to state agencies that 
occurred in the period  1975-80.  It is very difficult to pinpoint slack in an 
organization, because it does not show up with personnel just sitting around 
doing nothing. Slack may just as well consist in a hectic life at the workplace, 
because of  disorganization and inappropriate priorities. It is not until people 
in the organization receive a clear understanding of what their goals are that it 
Table 14.7  Prisons, Unit Cost Increase in Fixed Prices, 1960-1980  (%) 
Total cost increase 
Of which: 
+  252 
Vocational training, health care, leisure activities, 
permissions to  leave  +  28 
+ 10 
Reduction in the number of clients per supervisor  +  38 
Reduction of crowdiness  +  35 
Unexplained  + 141 
Reduced size of  prisons 536  Richard Murray 
becomes possible to organize the work in a suitable way and to make the right 
priorities. 
Even in such a labor intensive business as child care there may be slack. 
This is exposed by  large differences in unit costs among different day-care 
centers. The range may be up to 50 percent and increases when it is calculated 
on hours of child care instead of the number of places. Also, comparing the 
actual number of people at work, including all kinds of personnel, with what 
has been recommended nationally disguises a slack of 45 percent. 
14.6  Some Tentative Conclusions 
We may conclude that there has been a long period of productivity decline 
in the public sector of Sweden. This period coincides with the buildup of the 
welfare state. Being able to  measure outputs instead of just inputs, we may 
observe that there has been a real expansion of  government services, but not 
in proportion with the increase in resources spent. Productivity decline means 
that services become more costly. We have measured only the average cost. 
Measurement  of  the  marginal  cost  of  output  would  have  shown  an  even 
steeper upward slope. 
It might be said that our measures understate the increase in output by not 
capturing qualitative  improvements,  added features,  and new  products and 
that they do not include the advantages of an improved allocation of  outputs 
in relation to effectiveness or values of services.  But if that is so, we must 
conclude that when our measures of  output are compared with the ultimate 
state of affairs-that  is, with the general health of  the population, the attain- 
ment of  students, the  crime propensity,  tax receipts per  SEK spent on tax 
administration, and so on-output  seems to be less and less effective. 
The reasons for the general productivity decline seem to be a blend of slug- 
gish  response  in resource  use to variations  in demand, in diseconomies  of 
scale, rising marginal costs of  government programs as they are made more 
comprehensive, additions of new outputs and features with little effectiveness, 
and increasing slack. 
All these reasons are susceptible to manipulation.  Beginning in  1975, the 
state government embarked on a fiscal policy of selective restraint. Although 
the  budget  deficit  exploded  at  that  time,  state  government  agencies  were 
forced by,  on the one hand, less permissive appropriations in real terms-a 
substantial wage inflation occurred at the time-and  on the other hand, by a 
rapid increase in demand (work loads) to increase productivity. In the  1980s 
these agencies experienced zero growth of real resources. Public consumption 
of local governments grew at a faster rate than of the state government in the 
late 1970s and in the beginning of the  1980s. Productivity continued to de- 
cline, though  slightly less in  schools, and  there  was in  fact a productivity 
improvement in social welfare services. In health care productivity  declined 
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The achievement is also discouraging in comparison to the private service 
industry (table 14.8). Private service industries as measured in the national 
accounts may have a  1-2  percent increase in productivity per year.3 Some 
public sector services belong in fact to the private sector in that they are fi- 
nanced on a commercial basis. Those branches with a large public share are 
shown separately in table 14.8. 
Two of the branches have experienced a long-run positive productivity de- 
velopment-transportation  and telecommunications. In transportation there 
is a fairly large share of  private firms, enough to make competition real. In 
telecommunications there have been strong technological developments, but 
there are reasons to believe that a large part of the productivity increase stems 
from economies of  scale or scope. The other branches are housing, with a 
majority share of public housing and heavily regulated, postal services (100 
percent public) and sanitation, water and sewage (mainly public). The Swed- 
ish study found productivity decreases for all three branches. This reinforces 
the impression of a specific productivity problem in the public sector. 
14.7  Some Macroeconomic Implications 
The aggregated productivity decline for the public sector in Sweden in the 
1970s is -  1.5 percent per year. Is this sufficient to cause any alarm? 
In table 14.9 the productivity decline in the 1970s is used to recalculate the 
GNP. The figures sum up to the conclusion that GNP rose 25 percent less than 
officially recorded if  account of  the productivity decline is taken. The offi- 
cially recorded growth is 2.0 percent per year. Decreasing the growth of pub- 
lic consumption by  1.5 percent yearly reduces the growth of GNP to 1.5 per- 
cent per year. 
Knowing that the change in value-added productivity and total factor pro- 
ductivity come out  almost alike when  the  share of  intermediary inputs is 
small, one might recalculate GNP in value added terms taking the change in 
total factor productivity to be equal to the change in value-added productivity 
in the public sector. Another way of  doing this is to calculate the change in 
value-added productivity in the public sector by setting the value of its output 
equal to the unit cost in 1980. It produces exactly the expected result. In par- 
ticular, the decline of value-added productivity in the public sector as a whole 
is somewhat larger, -  1.8 percent per year over the period 1970-80. 
Accumulating the increased cost of  the public-sector production, due to 
decreased productivity, to borrowing requirements and adding to that also an 
interest charge of  10 percent-all  in nominal terms-adds  up to 106.7 billion 
3. There are deficiencies in the measures of  output of  the private service industry that may 
make many of  those of  the public sector in the Swedish report compare quite favorably. Note that 
the measured productivity in table 14.8 is not value-added productivity, but, in line with all other 
calculations,  total  factor  productivity.  In comparison  this  measure  of  productivity  produces 
smaller variations than value-added productivity. 538  Richard Murray 
Table 14.8  Productivity Growth in Private Services, 1965-1980  (yearly change 
in percent) 
1965-80 
Total  1.1 
Of  which: 
Transportation  2.2 
Housing  -1.1 
Postal services  -  1.5 
Telecommunications  1.3 
Sanitation, water, & sewage  -0.7 
Table 14.9  A Recalculation of GNP, 1980 Prices (billions of SEK) 




230.892  259.903  270.049 
1  1  1.89 1  113.590  121.556 
-  23.429  -  19.827  -  9.997 
Public consumption, assuming: 
Constant productivity  11  1.594  129.9 14  153.156 
Productivity decline 1.5%  17.774  10.646  ... 
per  Year 
GNP, assuming: 
Constant productivity in  432.647  49 1.546  525.099 
Productivity decline of  1.5%  450.421  502.192  525.099 
public consumption 
per year in public con- 
sumption 
SEK. During the 1970s the state government  debt increased  by  192 billion 
SEK. We may conclude that the productivity decline caused more than half of 
that. 
The increased cost of production is 21 billion SEK. One can add to that 8.6 
billion SEK of added interest payments on the accumulated state government 
debt. Had these costs not been incurred the tax ratio could have been lowered 
from 49.5 percent to 43.8 percent  of  GNP.  In  addition  to this  impressive 
amount, there is the deadweight loss of  taxes. 
This exercise in  calculation  leads to a  final conclusion.  Suppose output 
measures have completely  neglected quality improvements and that produc- 
tivity has in fact been constant or even increased. Of course, this would affect 
the rate of growth. However, the effect on the tax rate would  be the same: 
quality improvement  must be paid  for just as well  as productivity  decline. 
Therefore, we may conclude, that this development,  no matter whether it is 
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much longer. The development of the welfare state undermines its own foun- 
dations.  Either  taxes  must  be  raised  continuously  or the  volume  of  output 
must be reduced, implying that some people will not be served. With present 
day resources the -  2.2 percent productivity decrease in health care implies 
that in 20 years only two-thirds of the patients may be treated. 
Despite its shortcomings  the  Swedish study  has provided  many  valuable 
insights into the public sector. It seems to be the case that the public sector 
generally, but with notable exceptions, has a mounting problem of production 
efficiency. This observation has caught political  attention and administrative 
solutions are to a large extent sought in the application of output measure- 
ments and productivity monitoring along the same methodological lines that 
the study employed. 
The study has made quite clear the implications of declining productivity 
in the public sector for the Swedish economy as a whole. It has shown that it 
is both conceptually and practically possible to incorporate the public sector 
within  the  national  accounts  on  a  more  realistic  basis  than  on  the  zero- 
productivity-change assumption. This requires, though, that one sticks to the 
original  purpose  of national  accounts-that  of  describing production-and 
abstains from  ambitions  to  measure  the  well-being  of  nations.  Of  course, 
there  are many  improvements  to be made  in  the  measurements  of  public- 
sector outputs, just as there are improvements to be made in the measurement 
of private-sector outputs. 
Appendix A 
Sample of  Output Indicators 
Branch  Indicator 
Health care  Patients admitted 
Outpatient visits 
Bed days for inpatients 
Hours of attendance at school by pupils 
Children admitted to day-care centers 
Hours of  care of elderly people 
Number of recipients of benefits 
Bed days 
Hours of attendance at flight training 




Roads  Vehicle-miles 
Public libraries  Book loans 
Community planning  Volume of building construction 540  Richard Murray 







Board of agriculture 
Customs authorities 




Hours of  attendance at training 
Housing loans processed 
Housing loans administered 
Sentencing of offenders 
Internment places used 
Number of maps 
Revenue  in  fixed  prices  (deflated  by  user 
charges) 
Income tax returns processed 
Proceedings 
Consultations with farmers 
Inspections carried out 
Customs declarations 
People insured 




Revenue  in  fixed  prices  (deflated  by  user 
charges) 
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